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REGULATING WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND
UPHOLDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT-
AVOIDING A COLLISION
NADINE STROSSEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE other contributors to this Symposium have ably articu-
lated the governing general principles in evaluating the con-
stitutionality of any "hate speech" regulation-i.e., any regulation
of speech that conveys group-based hatred or discrimination.
Therefore, I will focus on some hard questions that are posed in
implementing these principles in particular factual contexts.
Within the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), we regularly
face concrete situations that force us to wrestle with difficult ques-
tions about the specific application of general principles.
Although we all share a commitment to free speech and equality
principles, we often disagree about how best to foster those val-
ues in particular factual settings. Such disagreement is especially
acute in factual settings where free speech and equality principles
seem to be in tension with each other.
After commenting upon the central, broadly accepted gen-
eral principles that govern hate speech controversies, this Article
will turn to an area in which scholars and judges are just begin-
ning to address the application of these principles: cases alleging
that some gender-based hate speech in the workplace constitutes
prohibited sexual harassment, violating the equality rights of fe-
male employees. This Article concentrates on two recent, much-
discussed cases in which the female employees' claims for relief
from sexual harassment collide with the free speech claims of
other employees or of the employer. These cases are Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,' and the case brought by female em-
ployees against Stroh's Brewery.2 Finally, this Article explains
* Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Civil Liber-
ties Union. A.B. 1972, Harvard-Radcliffe College; J.D. 1975, Harvard Law
School. The author thanks Elizabeth Dowell, William Mills, Karen Shelton and
Catherine Siemann for their research assistance.
1. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991). For a discussion of issues related to
the Robinson case, see infra notes 43-61 and accompanying text.
2. For a discussion of the issues involved in the pending litigation against
Stroh's Brewery, see infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
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that allowing broader regulation of workplace sexual harassment,
beyond the general principles set forth, could well undermine
rather than advance women's equality.
II. GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING REGULATION OF
CAMPUS OR WORKPLACE HARASSMENT
Before turning to specific controversies concerning the im-
plementation of widely accepted general principles governing
hate speech regulation, I would like to elaborate upon some key
aspects of these general principles.
A. Free Speech Principles
Most importantly, there is broad consensus within the legal
community that hate speech in a public forum is and should be
protected. This consensus is epitomized by the legal commu-
nity's reaction to the famous (or, for some, infamous) Skokie case.3
In that case, which occurred in the late 1970s, the ACLU cham-
pioned the free speech rights of a small group of neo-Nazis to
stage a peaceful demonstration in front of the Village Hall in Sko-
kie, Illinois. Because Skokie contained a large Jewish population,
many of whom were Holocaust survivors, the proposed demon-
stration generated much controversy among the Jewish commu-
nity in particular and among the public more generally. From a
legal perspective, though, the case was simple. With a single ex-
ception-a trial court judge in the Illinois state judicial system
(who soon had to run for re-election) 4-every one of the many
state and federal court judges to rule on the case held that the
First Amendment protected the free speech rights of the neo-
Nazis. 5
3. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916
(1978); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21 (111.
1978). For an excellent account of both the specific Skokie controversy and the
general issues it raised, see ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING My ENEMY: AMERICAN NA-
ZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979).
4. See Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 366 N.E.2d 347,
349 (11. App. Ct. 1977) (noting that circuit court judge, in unpublished order,
had enjoined defendant from conducting demonstration in Skokie), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 373 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1978).
5. Village of Skokie, 366 N.E.2d at 347 (holding prior restraint of demonstra-
tion unconstitutional), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 373 N.E.2d 21 (111. 1978) (con-
cluding that swastika is symbolic speech with First Amendment protection); see
also Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.) (determining that ordinances
enacted by Skokie in further attempt to limit neo-Nazi demonstration violated
First Amendment), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
916 (1978).
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Despite differences of opinion regarding other aspects of the
hate speech debate, all participants in this Symposium agree with
the established, fundamental principle that was reaffirmed in the
Skokie case: hate speech in a public forum is constitutionally pro-
tected. Although Professor Charles Lawrence has urged that cer-
tain aspects of the established constitutional principles applicable
to hate speech regulation should be modified, 6 he has not ques-
tioned the rulings in the Skokie litigation. To the contrary, he has
explicitly endorsed the Skokie holdings protecting the right to ex-
press group-based hatred in a public forum.7 Floyd Abrams in his
presentation referred to the 1942 writings by sociologist David
Riesman, in which Professor Riesman advocated restrictions on
public forum hate speech.8 However, upon further reflection,
Professor Riesman subsequently recanted that position. Specifi-
cally, in the late 1970s, Professor Riesman expressed his support
of the ACLU's position in the Skokie case.9
Corresponding to the consensus that hate speech in a public
forum should be protected is the consensus that hate speech in
certain other settings should not receive First Amendment pro-
tections. In particular, in settings where the listeners have impor-
tant privacy interests, hate speech may not be directed at them, in
order to protect those interests. The clearest example of such a
setting is the home. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has ruled
that some types of expression may be restricted in order to pro-
tect the privacy right to be free from unwanted intrusions into the
6. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (advocating regulation of certain racially
motivated hate speech in non-public forum contexts). But see Nadine Strossen,
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484 (re-
sponding to Lawrence).
7. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 6, at 457 & n.103.
8. David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42
COLUM. L. REV. 727, 731 (1942) ("The isolated person is as helpless in the face
of systematic defamation by opposing groups (or of destructive non-defamatory
falsehoods, for which there is not even a theoretical remedy in many cases), as in
the face of concerted economic power."); David Riesman, Democracy and Defama-
tion: Fair Game and Fair Comment I, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (1942) (discussing
defamation laws of Germany, France and England as providing necessary back-
drop for discussing regulation of growing fascist group defamation tactics in
United States); David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Com-
ment 11, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1282 (1942) (describing United States libel laws as
inadequately controlling fascist hate speech without further government
regulation).
9. See SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF
THE ACLU 330, 437 n.23 (1990) (noting that Riesman became member of ACLU
"because of the ACLU's defense of the Nazis' right to demonstrate in Skokie").
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home.10 However, the Court has held that free speech values may
outweigh privacy concerns, even in the home, requiring individu-
als to receive certain unwanted communications there."I
Another type of setting in which the Court has recognized
that privacy rights justify restraints on unwanted expression is
one where the speaker's audience is "captive." Although the
Supreme Court has not precisely defined the concept of a "cap-
tive audience,"' 2 the definition at least requires that the individu-
als in question be in a particular place at a certain time to pursue
an important purpose.' 3 Even so, the Court has recognized that
"we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and
subject to objectionable speech,"' 14 and therefore the Court has
ruled that, in public places, we bear the burden of overlooking
expression we find offensive.15 As Professor Tribe has cautioned,
the "captive audience" concept "is dangerously encompassing,
and the Court has properly been reluctant to accept its implica-
tions whenever a regulation is not content-neutral."' 6
10. See, e.g., Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737
(1970) (upholding statutory right of addressee to compel mailer of erotic mate-
rial to remove addressee's name from mailing list and stop all future mailings);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (upholding ordinance barring use of
sound trucks in "loud and raucous" manner, in part because individual home-
owner was "practically helpless to escape" noise).
11. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 542
(1980) (rejecting "captive audience" objection to utility company's insertion of
materials advocating nuclear power development in its billings, reasoning that
customers could "escape exposure to the objectionable material simply by trans-
ferring the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket").
12. See Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 85, 88, 121 (1991) (showing how current case law is "riddled with
inconsistency and ambiguity," and proposing factors courts should consider in
employing captive audience concept and balancing it against free speech inter-
ests; goal is to make doctrine "a method of analysis, not just a catchy slogan").
13. See id. at 89-103.
14. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738.
15. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-12 (1975)
(holding that ordinance banning movies showing nudity on drive-in screens visi-
ble from street could not be upheld to protect sensibilities of involuntary pass-
ers-by); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (observing that individuals
offended by expression on defendant's jacket worn in courthouse corridor
"could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by
averting their eyes").
16. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-19, at 949-
50 n.24 (2d ed. 1988). For an argument that the "captive audience" concept
should be construed narrowly, see Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There
a Right Not to Be Spoken to?, 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 153 (1972). Haiman reasons that
human beings have a significant ability mentally to reject many assault-
ing stimuli. The process known as "selective perception" enables us to
generally choose what we wish to assimilate from the multitude of sen-
sory bombardments surrounding us .... [W]e also have a strong ten-
760
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It could be plausibly argued that the doctrine extends to stu-
dents who are required to be at particular places on campus to
pursue their education and to employees who are required to be
at particular locations in the workplace to pursue their jobs. 17
Some courts18 and commentators 19 have applied the captive audi-
ence theory to employees at work. However, a recent article per-
suasively argues that "the Court has . . . never found that
employees in the workplace are 'captive,' and there are good rea-
sons for it not to do SO. '20 Moreover, even if employees were
reasonably viewed as captive audiences in certain workplace ar-
eas, that still would not justify the selective prohibition or punish-
ment of speech based on its content or viewpoint. 2' Therefore,
dency to screen out or distort messages that are inconsistent with ...
our current beliefs....
Given these tendencies .... one might argue that the possibilities
of unwelcome messages penetrating the psychological armor of unwill-
ing audiences are so small that we ought to be worrying more about
how to help unpopular communicators get through to reluctant listen-
ers than how to give further protection from speech to those who may
already know too well how to isolate themselves from alien ideas.
Id. at 184.
17. Strauss, supra note 12, at 100-03.
18. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535
(M.D. Fla. 1991) ("[F]emale workers ... are a captive audience in relation to the
speech that comprises the hostile work environment."); Resident Advisory Bd. v.
Rizzo, 503 F. Supp. 383, 402 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that workers at job site
were captive to harassing messages delivered over loudspeakers; only way to
avoid speech was to quit jobs).
19. See J. M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to
the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 423 ("Few audiences are more captive
than the average worker."); Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 36 (1990) ("Employees at work, like residents in their
homes, may qualify for captive audience status.").
20. Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment,
39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1832-33 (1992) (noting that Court has never upheld
content-based speech restrictions on "captive audience" rationale outside the
home).
21. See id. at 1840-43 (citing Supreme Court decisions). Likewise, the
ACLU approves of speech regulations to protect captive audiences only when
they are content- and viewpoint-neutral. See ACLU, POLICY GUIDE OF THE AMER-
ICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (rev. ed. 1992) [hereinafter ACLU POLICY GUIDE],
at Policy No. 43. The policy, entitled Captive Audiences, states:
[T]he First Amendment is not inconsistent with reasonable regulations
designed to restrict sensory intrusions so intense as to be assaultive.
Reasonable regulations are those that apply only to time, place and
manner without regard to content .... What constitutes a "reasonable"
regulation will necessarily vary depending upon such factors as (1) the
size of the ... area involved, (2) the duration [or] frequency with which
an individual is in the area .... or (3) the extent to which alternatives
exist so that the individual can reasonably be called upon to avoid the
area .... Assaultive sensory intrusions are those that are objectionable
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
speech could not be selectively punished for conveying discrimi-
natory attitudes toward women or members of racial minorities.
B. Equality Principles
The legal community's consensus supporting the foregoing
free speech principles is matched by a consensus supporting the
right to equality of opportunity regardless of one's membership
in certain socially defined groups, including groups defined in
terms of race, gender, national origin or religion. Because the
pursuit of education and employment facilitates both the exercise
of rights and the enjoyment of life, our legal system has consist-
ently recognized that equality values are especially compelling in
these contexts. In its landmark ruling in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,22 the Supreme Court stressed the special importance of edu-
cation, and therefore of eliminating race-based discrimination in
education. 23 The special importance of equality in employment
was recognized by Congress' passage of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, which bars employment discrimination on the
basis of race, gender and other invidious classifications. 24
Meaningful equality of opportunity in the educational and
employment spheres requires more than mere non-discrimination
at the entry level. It is not enough simply to open the doors of
universities and workplaces to African Americans, women and
members of other groups that have traditionally been excluded.
Meaningful equality of opportunity also encompasses a full
chance to participate and to succeed in both arenas. Thus, for
to the average person because of an excessive degree of intensity, e.g.,
volume or brightness, and which cannot be avoided.
Id. (emphasis added).
22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23. Id. at 493 ("In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms.").
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988) ("It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... ").
[Vol. 37: p. 757
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example, the courts25 and Congress 26 have recognized that em-
ployees should be protected from harassment that is based on
their race, gender or other group membership. Likewise, many
universities have taken measures to protect students from such
harassment. 27
In both settings, the prohibited harassment may consist of
words or expressive conduct.2 8 Yet, this expression may be pro-
hibited, consistent with the First Amendment, for several reasons.
First, the mere fact that harassing conduct consists in part of ex-
pression never has been viewed as sufficient to immunize it from
regulation. Even the ACLU, which takes a broad view of the First
Amendment, never has argued that the First Amendment protects
targeted individual harassment just because it uses the vehicle of
expression. 29 Second, as previously indicated, those to whom
harassing expression is directed on campus and in the workplace
may well constitute "captive audience" members, entitled to pro-
tection from unwanted verbal assaults. Finally, conduct that vio-
lates the right to equal educational or employment opportunities
25. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1985) ("[A] claim
of 'hostile environment' sex discrimination is actionable under Title VII ....");
see also Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 601 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that
"leers ... obscene gestures ... [and] lewd comments" constitute sexual harass-
ment); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir.
1977) (finding sexual harassment in verbal and physical threats); Rogers v.
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding that employee's state of
psychological well-being is term, condition, or privilege of employment within
meaning of Title VII), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
26. 1991 Civil Rights Act § 101(2)(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981(b) (West Supp.
1992) (prohibiting discrimination in "making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts"), overruling Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 176-78 (1989) (finding racial harassment not actionable under 1866
Civil Rights Act, which prohibited discrimination in "makting] and en-
force[ment]" of contracts; Court interpreted latter term as applying only to con-
tract formation and unlawful dismissal, but not to conditions of employment
itself).
27. See CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, A SPE-
CIAL REPORT: CAMPUS LIFE, IN SEARCH OF COMMUNITY, 17-23 & app. B, tbl. 8
(1990) (showing that 60% of chief student affairs officers surveyed reported that
campuses had written policies on bigotry, racial harassment or intimidation; an-
other 11% reported they were working on such policies).
28. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment
Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 484, 491-98 (1991) (discuss-
ing numerous sexual harassment claims in which complained-of conduct was ex-
pression); Volokh, Comment, supra note 20, at 1800-16 (same).
29. See, e.g., ACLU POLICY GUIDE, supra note 21, at Policy No. 72a (Free
Speech and Bias on College Campuses), discussed and quoted infra at text accompany-
ing notes 30-35, and reproduced as Appendix A to this Article; Policy No. 316
(Sexual Harassment in the Workplace), discussed and quoted infra note 36 and ac-
companying text.
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should not be condoned simply because it includes expressive
elements.
The principles outlined thus far, as to which there is broad
consensus, may be summarized as follows: hate speech in a pub-
lic forum is protected, but hate speech that harasses particular
individuals in certain other settings, such as the campus or the
workplace, may be prohibited. So far, so good. But now we reach
the difficult matter of applying these broad principles to particu-
lar factual situations. What exactly is harassment? When does
expression cross the line from protected free speech to prohib-
ited harassment?
C. Reconciling Free Speech and Equality Principles
As is always the case in free speech and other constitutional
controversies, the broad governing principles have to be applied
in a contextual fashion, sensitive to all the relevant facts and cir-
cumstances in each particular case. The ACLU's policies gov-
erning verbal harassment on campus and in the workplace
provide some helpful guidelines for evaluating whether a specific
expression should be protected or not.
For example, the ACLU's policy concerning campus hate
speech codes, Free Speech and Bias on College Campuses,30 states that
it "does not prohibit colleges and universities from enacting disci-
plinary codes aimed at restricting acts of harassment, intimidation
and invasion of privacy." 3' Although the policy recognizes that
these "are imprecise terms susceptible of impermissibly over-
broad application, " 32 it provides the following guidance as to
their contours:
[E]ach term defines a type of conduct which is legally
proscribed in many jurisdictions when directed at a spe-
cific individual or individuals and when intended to
frighten, coerce, or unreasonably harry or intrude upon
its target. Threatening telephone calls to a minority stu-
dent's dormitory room, for example, would be proscrib-
able conduct under the terms of this policy. Expressive
behavior which has no other effect than to create an un-
pleasant learning environment, however, would not be
30. ACLU POLICY GUIDE, supra note 21, at Policy No. 72a. For the com-
plete text of this policy, see Appendix A.
31. ACLU POLIcY GUIDE, supra note 21, at Policy No. 72a, at 142a.
32. Id. at 142a n.3.
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the proper subject of regulation.33
The ACLU policy recognizes that, as is true of all speech re-
strictions, "great care must be taken to avoid applying" campus
hate speech codes to protected expression. 34 Accordingly, the
ACLU policy stresses that careful, fact-oriented analysis should be
undertaken regarding the manner in which any such code is ap-
plied, including an examination of "time, place, pattern of con-
duct, and the existence of an authority relationship between
speaker and target."35
The ACLU's policy concerning sexual harassment in the
workplace also articulates some criteria for the sometimes difficult
task of line-drawing between protected expression and prohibited
harassment. This policy provides the following definition of pros-
cribable harassment:
Where conduct or expression is sufficiently perva-
sive or intense that its effect on a reasonable person in
those particular circumstances would be to hinder signif-
icantly a person from functioning as an employee or sig-
nificantly adversely effect mental, emotional, or physical
well-being on the basis of sex. Conduct or expression
that meets this definition is actionable because of the
unique characteristics of the workplace-including the
existence of authority relationships, the economic neces-
sity to remain, and the limited opportunity to respond-
even though it might not be actionable in other settings.
Such behavior need not amount to constructive dis-
charge, and is not immunized because expression is in-
volved. Harassment under this policy is actionable
whether or not it was directed at any particular
employee.3 6
To summarize the foregoing discussion, whether speech is
protected or prohibited turns on its context. Where is the speech
taking place? Is it in a public forum or a nonpublic setting? Is it
in a place where the audience members have strong privacy inter-
ests? What is the relationship between the place where the
speech takes place and the audience? Is the audience captive, in
that they are required to be in that place? How large is the audi-
33. Id.
34. Id. at 142b.
35. Id. at 142b n.2.
36. ACLU POLICY GUIDE, supra note 21, at Policy No. 316.
1992]
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ence? Is the speech directly targeted at a single individual or a
small group of individuals, or is it addressed to a broader group?
What is the relationship between the audience and the speaker?
Is there a hierarchical relationship? Different constellations of
answers to the foregoing questions can lead to differing conclu-
sions as to the protected or unprotected status of the particular
speech at issue.
III. APPLICATION OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO CLAIMS OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
A. Overview
To illustrate the line-drawing questions that are presented in
particular factual situations, I would like to discuss two current
cases concerning sexual harassment in the workplace. I prefer to
focus on the workplace harassment issue, rather than that of cam-
pus hate speech, because sexual harassment in the workplace has
received far less scholarly or judicial attention. While numerous
articles have discussed the appropriate accommodation of free
speech and equality concerns in the context of campus hate
speech controversies,3 7 only a few articles have discussed the par-
allel question in the context of workplace harassment.3 8 Likewise,
37. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University,
79 GEO. L.J. 399 (1991) (advocating greater ability to regulate racially abusive
speech on university campuses than in society at large because of need to pro-
tect academic values); Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional
Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343 (1991) (discussing proper character-
ization and extent of campus racism and describing and evaluating various rules
enacted to deal with problem); Lawrence, supra note 6 (explaining both sides of
hate speech-free speech debate and proposing method for regulating hate
speech); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 267 (1991) (using various university racist speech regulations as
basis for discussion of First Amendment protections regarding hate speech);
Strossen, supra note 6, at 494 (maintaining "that equality will be served most
effectively by continuing to apply traditional speech-protective precepts to racist
speech because a robust freedom of speech ultimately is necessary to combat
racial discrimination"); Nicholas Wolfson, Free Speech Theory and Hateful Words, 60
U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1991) (advocating strong First Amendment position regard-
ing hate speech regulation to limit power of censorship); David F. McGowan &
Ragesh K. Tangri, Comment, A Libertarian Critique of University Restrictions of Offen-
sive Speech, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 825 (1991) (arguing that public university regula-
tions regarding race-based speech should only be permitted to restrict "fighting
words" and certain limited offensive nonpublic speech); Evan G.S. Siegel, Com-
ment, Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression: The Regulation of Offensive Speech at
Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY L.J. 1351 (1990) (exploring legal implications
of campus regulations regarding hate speech and concluding that such policies
will fail to cure problems at issue).
38. Browne, supra note 28, at 545 ("The one circumstance in which expres-
sion might be relied upon consistent with the first amendment to support a
[Vol. 37: p. 757766
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although the courts have adjudicated numerous workplace sexual
harassment cases in which the complained-of conduct constituted
expression,3 9 almost none have even acknowledged that the First
Amendment was implicated, let alone seriously discussed this as-
pect of the cases. 40 In contrast, two federal courts recently have
ruled on free speech challenges to university codes regulating
hate speech.4 1
It seems especially propitious to focus on the intersection of
free speech and equality concerns in the context of workplace
sexual harassment at this time, for two reasons. First, legal, as
well as public, interest in the subject was recently stimulated by
Anita Hill's charges that Clarence Thomas had subjected her to
such harassment when she worked for him. Second, now that a
rich scholarly literature, as well as some judicial decisions, have
explored the problem of distinguishing protected hate speech
from unprotected harassment on campus, it seems helpful to
draw upon those writings to assess the similar problem posed by
workplace harassment claims.
To put in perspective some workplace harassment problems
that involve relatively difficult accommodations between compet-
claim of hostile environment is when expression is used to show motive, but the
expression may not be used to add weight to the assertion that the environment
was hostile."); Strauss, supra note 19, at 49 ("Sexist speech [in the workplace]
can be regulated... consistent with the first amendment so long as the speech is
made with discriminatory intent or causes a direct discriminatory effect, or if the
offended listener constitutes a captive audience. A ban on non-directed speech
which holds no one captive and which does not discriminate would .. .violate
the constitution."); Amy Horton, Comment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Cen-
sorship: Sexual Harassment, the First Amendment, and the Contours of Title VII, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 403, 452-53 (1991) (concluding that "[w]hen the workplace ratio
of men to women, the positions of women within the workplace hierarchy, and
the traditional role of women within the workplace or occupation reveals a pat-
tern of male dominance, courts may infer that pinup posters and the like stereo-
type woman [sic] as sex objects," and violate Title VII); Volokh, Comment, supra
note 20, at 1846 (recommending that liability be imposed for only that subset of
speech creating hostile work environment that speaker knows is offensive and
that is directed at employee because of her sex).
39. See Browne, supra note 28, at 491-98 (discussing numerous sexual har-
assment claims in which complained-of conduct was expression); Volokh, Com-
ment, supra note 20, at 1800-16 (same).
40. See Browne, supra note 28, at 501 (stating that "[s]urprisingly, the first
amendment is seldom invoked" in cases involving offensive expressive conduct
in workplace); Horton, Comment, supra note 38, at 418 (noting that in Robinson,
"[for perhaps the first time in a sexual harassment case, a court addressed First
Amendment issues at length").
41. See UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F.
Supp. 1163, 1180-81 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (holding university hate speech rule un-
constitutionally overbroad and unduly vague); Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F.
Supp. 852, 864-67 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (same).
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ing free speech and equality concerns, I would first like to de-
scribe two workplace situations that represent the two extremes
on the spectrum between clearly protected expression and clearly
unprotected harassment. On the one hand, if an employee
chooses to read Playboy Magazine in the employees' cafeteria dur-
ing his or her lunch break, that expressive activity should be pro-
tected, even if female employees are offended or insulted by it.
As the Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized, the mere fact
that expression offends the sensibilities of some who are exposed
to it is not sufficient justification for restricting it; if it were, we
would have no free speech.42 On the other hand, if a supervisor
repeatedly makes unwelcome sexually explicit overtures to an em-
ployee, thus adversely affecting the employee's ability to function
effectively at work, that conduct should be unprotected, even
though it consists entirely of expression.
In between these extremes, reasonable advocates of free
speech and gender equality may disagree about the particular bal-
ance to be struck between these two sets of values. For example,
suppose a supervisor chooses to decorate his office with Playboy
pinups that are offensive to his assistant, who is required to spend
much of her work time in that office; how should the balance be
struck in that situation?
Now let's turn to the two actual cases as to which there has
been widespread discussion and disagreement within the feminist
and civil liberties communities.
B. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.
One set of challenging issues is posed by Robinson v. Jackson-
ville Shipyards, Inc. ,43 in which the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida upheld claims of sexual harassment
on hostile work environment grounds 44 and issued extensive re-
42. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (unanimously
holding that public figure may not recover damages for emotional harm caused
by publication of ad parody offensive to him); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971) (overturning breach of peace conviction premised on offensive nature of
words on jacket worn in courtroom hallway).
43. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
44. "Hostile environment" sexual harassment claims are based on Title
VII's language prohibiting discrimination "with respect to ... conditions ... of
employment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988). Guidelines of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) define such harassment as unwel-
come sexual behavior by anyone in the workplace that creates an "intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment," or has the "purpose or effect of unrea-
sonably interfering with an individual's work performance." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a) (1992).
768 [Vol. 37: p. 757
WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT
medial orders. Plaintiff Lois Robinson was one of a "very small
number of female skilled craftworkers employed" at the Ship-
yards. 45 Her allegations of sexual harassment centered around
"the presence in the workplace of pictures of women in various
stages of undress and in sexually suggestive or submissive poses,
as well as remarks by male employees and supervisors which de-
mean women." 46 There was some evidence of several incidents
in which the sexually suggestive pictures and comments were di-
rected at Robinson.47 As to most such pictures and remarks,
though, there was no evidence that they were directed specifically
at Robinson. Nonetheless, they were the primary evidence upon
which the district court relied in finding liability. 48
The district court's ruling is currently on appeal before the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. In
March 1992, the national ACLU and its Florida affiliate filed a
joint amicus curiae brief which challenged certain aspects of the
lower court's decision as transgressing free speech principles.
(Thus, the ACLU brief was in part supportive of, and in part di-
vergent from, the positions of both the female plaintiff and the
defendant employer.) Because of the difficulties entailed in ap-
plying agreed-upon legal principles to particular factual situa-
tions, the national and Florida ACLU organizations engaged in
lengthy internal discussions before finalizing the amicus brief.
These internal debates received a great deal of media atten-
tion, no doubt because they dramatized the difficulty of the free
speech and equality issues implicit in many workplace harassment
claims. For example, a USA Today article on the case was entitled,
Harassment, Free Speech Collide in Florida, and subtitled, National and
State ACLU Offices Square Off.49 The text reads, in part:
ACLU v. ACLU. Strange but true. The American Civil
Liberties Union appears heading for an embarrassing
public rift in a landmark case involving free-speech
rights. The ACLU of Florida plans to defend the right of
shipyard workers to make vulgar comments and hang
photos of nude women.... The ACLU Women's Rights
Project, based in the national office in New York, will file
45. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1491.
46. Id. at 1490.
47. Id. at 1496-99.
48. Id. at 1522-32.
49. Dennis Cauchon, Harassment, Free Speech Collide in Florida: National and
State ACLU Offices Square Off, USA TODAY, Nov. 20, 1991, at 9A.
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a legal brief opposing the Florida group if it doesn't
soften its First Amendment position.50
The USA Today article quotes me as saying that the alleged
conflict between the Florida and national offices "shows the won-
derful diversity in the ACLU." 5 1 Spoken like a true politician! In
seriousness, though, this point gives me the opportunity to ex-
press my wholehearted agreement with Professor Fred Schauer's
observation, during his presentation at this Symposium, that
there should be free speech about free speech. 52 Far from being
embarrassed that there is full and open discussion, including disa-
greement, within the ACLU, I am proud of that fact. It demon-
strates that the ACLU really is committed to freedom of thought
and of expression. To the contrary, I would be embarrassed if
there were no freedom to debate and to dissent within the ACLU,
if the organization really were the calcified monolith that George
Bush caricatured during the 1988 presidential election campaign.
Given the complexities of many current civil liberties issues,
it is inconceivable that thoughtful civil libertarians would unani-
mously agree on all the governing principles, let alone on how
those principles should be applied to particular factual situations.
Thus, the first flaw in the USA Today article was its suggestion that
there is something embarrassing about disagreement among civil
libertarians on how to apply free speech- and equality principles to
the facts at issue in a workplace sexual harassment case.
The second flaw in the USA Today article is its oversimplifica-
tion of the issues. This is illustrated by a caption that appeared
beneath my photograph. The caption said, "Strossen: Believes
nude photos not free speech." 53 Obviously that statement is inac-
curately oversimplified. As I have explained in the present Arti-
cle, every free speech issue is fact-specific. 54 Therefore, one
cannot make blanket assessments about the protected or unpro-
tected nature of any type of speech. It certainly is not true that
nude photographs in the workplace are categorically unprotected
by the First Amendment. Likewise, it is equally untrue that such
photographs are generically protected by the First Amendment.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Frederick Schauer, The Sociology of the Hate Speech Debate, 37 VLL. L.
REv. 805, 806 (1992).
53. Cauchon, supra note 49, at 9A.
54. For a discussion of the fact-specific nature of free speech issues, see
supra text accompanying notes 30-36.
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As always in free speech controversies, whether or not nude
photographs are protected in the workplace depends on a whole
range of contextual factors. There are some situations where
such photographs would clearly be protected, others where they
would clearly be unprotected, and still others where the photo-
graphs' status would be unclear. For example, if male employees
repeatedly attached nude photographs to a female employee's
locker, or inserted them inside her locker, against her wishes, that
conduct-albeit expressive-would clearly constitute unprotected
harassment. On the other hand, as previously noted, if individual
employees look at nude photographs in a magazine, without di-
rectly displaying them to any other employee who does not want
to see them, that conduct-even if offensive to some employees-
would clearly constitute protected expressive activity.
Only with respect to some situations between these two ex-
tremes was there disagreement among ACLU activists about
whether the challenged expressive conduct fell on the protected
or unprotected side of the line. For example, the management of
Jacksonville Shipyards allowed its employees to post nude photo-
graphs of women on the walls of common work areas, but forbade
the posting of other types of materials in these areas. 55 Under
such circumstances, individuals who are committed to both free
speech and equality in the workplace might reasonably disagree
about whether or not Jacksonville Shipyards employees should be
allowed to continue to post nude photographs in the common
areas.
On the one hand, one could reasonably argue that the com-
mon areas are important arenas in which employees can express
themselves through the posting of pictures, and that the photo-
graphs were not directly targeted at other employees, hence not
constituting harassment. On the other hand, one could plausibly
contend that employees can express themselves through posting
pictures on their own lockers, and should not be free to impose
any unwanted images upon objecting fellow employees, who are
forced to see them in the common areas.
The amicus brief that the state and national ACLUs submitted
to the Eleventh Circuit in the Robinson appeal is sensitive to both
of these plausible views, and argues for a remedial order that
would foster both free speech and equality values. The brief
reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
55. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1493-94.
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[T]he Order bans the public display of "sexually sugges-
tive" materials without regard to whether the expressive
activity is directed at any employee .... For this reason,
amici suggest that, as written, this remedial provision is
overbroad. However, in light of the fact that [Jackson-
ville Shipyards] has itself historically banned all public
displays of expressive activity except sexual materials, this
Court may wish to consider the imposition of a work-
place rule that would right the balance-i.e., encourage
freedom of expression while reducing the one-sidedness
of the visual environment. Such a rule could require the
employer, if it permits the posting of sexual materials,
also to permit the posting of other materials-materials
critical of such sexual expression, as well as other polit-
ical, religious or social messages, which are currently
banned in the Jacksonville Shipyards workplace. Good
faith implementation of such a rule would require the
employer to ensure fair access to all competing
messages. Such a rule would implement a "more
speech" approach to counter offensive speech, and
would offer increased opportunity for expression while
providing alternatives to those who find certain expres-
sion objectionable. 56
Throughout, the ACLU amicus brief in Robinson strikes an ap-
propriate balance between equality and free speech concerns,
carefully distinguishing between protected speech and punishable
harassment. The thrust of the brief is captured in its Summary of
the Argument section, which reads as follows:
The proper standard of liability for "hostile work
environment" sexual harassment under Title VII must
be carefully crafted to reconcile the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech and the right to be free
from sexual harassment in the workplace. In this case
the relevant conduct as alleged by Robinson [the plain-
tiff] consisted entirely of obnoxious and offensive speech
or other expressive activity. However, expressive activi-
56. Brief for Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of
Florida, Inc. and American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. at 21-22, Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. (No. 91-3655) (filed with 1lth Circuit on Mar. 9,
1992).
[Vol. 37: p. 757
WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT
ties cannot constitutionally be held to be unlawful "har-
assment" simply because of their offensiveness....
The District Court did not undertake the proper in-
quiry in determining liability. Instead, the District Court
proceeded from the erroneous assumption that expres-
sion can constitute harassment merely because an em-
ployee finds it offensive. Most of the expression relied
on by the District Court for its finding of harassment
consisted of sexually explicit pin-ups, pictures, calen-
dars, and remarks, none of which was specifically di-
rected at Robinson. Although there was evidence in the
record of comments specifically directed at Robinson,
the District Court failed to make such a finding. If it had
found evidence of expression directed at Robinson, the
District Court's inquiry should have turned to whether
Robinson suffered definable consequences that demon-
strably hindered or completely prevented her from con-
tinuing to function as an employee. The District Court
likewise failed to undertake this inquiry. 57
The ACLU was specifically concerned that three of the dis-
trict court's remedial orders were overbroad and therefore viola-
tive of First Amendment protections. The brief explained:
Certain aspects of the District Court's remedial or-
der are not narrowly tailored, and therefore violate the
First Amendment. First, the Order bans possession,
reading and privately displaying "sexually suggestive"
materials. Second, it prohibits jokes and other com-
ments "in the presence" of any employee who objects.
Third, it bans the public display of "sexually suggestive"
materials without regard to whether they are directed at
any employee. These provisions amount to a prior re-
straint on otherwise lawful speech, and are unconstitu-
tionally overbroad. 58
The court's prohibition on displaying "sexually suggestive"
materials extended to a breathtakingly broad range of pictures
and photographs, given the court's open-ended definition of the
central term:
A picture will be presumed to be sexually suggestive if it
57. Id. at 5-6.
58. Id. at 6.
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depicts a person of either sex who is not fully clothed or
in clothes that are not suited to or ordinarily accepted
for the accomplishment of routine work in and around
the shipyard and who is posed for the obvious purpose
of displaying or drawing attention to private portions of
his or her body. 59
This sweeping definition encompasses innumerable items that
employees might legitimately choose to display or look at, includ-
ing reproductions of countless artistic masterpieces, numerous
women's magazines and photographs of wives or daughters.
The ACLU brief's specific comments regarding the last of
the three overly broad remedial orders-the one banning the
public display of "sexually suggestive" materials-were excerpted
above. 60 Further guidance for drawing a line between protected
expression and prohibited harassment is provided by the brief's
comments regarding the first two overly broad remedial orders-
those banning private displays of "sexually suggestive" materials
and jokes in the presence of an objecting employee:
[The Order] ban[s] possessing, reading, and pri-
vately displaying "sexually suggestive" materials ...
This ban would prohibit employees from keeping por-
nography in their backpacks or lockers or showing it to
others discreetly in the locker room. Moreover, the Or-
der's definition of "sexually suggestive" is unnecessarily
broad, as it could be construed to apply to photographs
of family and friends. Clearly there is no interest served
by these prohibitions, particularly since the banned ex-
pressive activity occurs in areas that other employees or-
dinarily could avoid.
Second, the Order overbroadly enjoins jokes and
other speech "in the presence" of any employee who ob-
jects. ... There is a difference between some employees
telling jokes that another employee finds offensive, and
other employees engaging in such joke-telling every time
the offended employee is within earshot, so as to taunt
her. The former may be offensive and insensitive, but is
protected. The latter could well amount to a directed
pattern of harassment. Any remedial ... order must re-
59. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1542.
60. For these comments, see supra text accompanying note 56.
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flect this distinction. 61
C. Sexual Harassment Allegations Against Stroh's Brewery
In addition to the Robinson case, another case alleging sexual
harassment in the workplace recently has received substantial me-
dia attention. This is the case in which female employees of
Stroh's Brewery in St. Paul, Minnesota have charged that a televi-
sion advertisement for Old Milwaukee beer (which is produced by
Stroh's Brewery) contributes to sexual harassment in the brewery,
and therefore the advertisement should be taken off the air to
remedy the harassment. 62 The advertisement depicts a group of
men on a fishing trip who fantasize that Stroh's beer is delivered
to them by the Swedish Bikini Team, a group of bikini-clad wo-
men. At the time of this writing, the case had not yet proceeded
to trial nor resulted in any judicial ruling on the merits.
The plaintiffs' factual allegations suggest that they were the
victims of pervasive sexual harassment at the brewery. Plaintiffs
allege that they were repeatedly subjected to targeted, unwanted
physical contacts and other sexual advances. If the plaintiffs can
substantiate these allegations, they should be able to establish lia-
bility and to secure a remedial order prohibiting any further har-
assment in the workplace itself.63 However, the remedial order
could not properly extend to the company's television advertise-
ment. As commercial speech, the advertisement is within the
scope of First Amendment protection. 64 Because the com-
61. Amicus Brief at 20-21, Robinson (No. 91-3655).
62. Arthur S. Hayes, Stroh's Case Pits Feminists Against ACLU, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 14, 1991, at B6.
63. See, e.g., HenryJ. Reske, Stroh's Ads Targeted, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1992, at 20.
The allegations include: "being subjected to obscene and sexist comments, por-
nographic magazines and posters, slaps on the buttocks by male employees, and
male co-workers following them home." Id. During the investigation, the plain-
tiffs' attorney, Lori Peterson, had the idea that the company's advertising could
be implicated as contributing to the hostile work environment. " 'I thought, [the
company is] harassing [the female employees] with [its] own advertising' . . . .
To [Peterson], it was crystal clear that the women viewed the advertising as a
company endorsement of harassment and that the men used it as a weapon." Id.
64. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)
(holding that ban on attorney's use of illustrations in advertising was unconstitu-
tional); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (concluding that
city's general ban on billboards, which affected non-commercial advertising, was
unconstitutional under First and Fourteenth Amendments); Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (stating that
regulation on utility advertising violated First and Fourteenth Amendments);
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (deciding that regulation regarding op-
tometry practice advertising was constitutional as means of ensuring fair and full
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plaining female employees are not forced to watch the advertise-
ment, it cannot be taken off the air under the "captive audience"
rationale.
Therefore, to limit the beer advertisement, one would have
to argue that Stroh's airing of it contributes to a climate at its
brewery in which women are more likely to be sexually harassed.
This attenuated, speculative causal connection between com-
plained-of speech and anti-social conduct is simply too remote to
justify suppressing speech. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held, speech may only be restricted if it causes actual or imminent
harm-i.e., if it creates a "clear and present danger" of violence
or illegality. For example, the Court has held that advocacy of
illegal conduct may not be prohibited on the theory that it might
result in such illegal conduct; only intentional incitement of ille-
gal activity, which will imminently cause such activity, may be
proscribed. 65
The argument that Stroh's television advertisements should
be suppressed because they might lead to harassment at Stroh's
Brewery is an attempt to revive the discredited "bad tendency"
test that was used to suppress speech earlier in this century. 66 For
example, in decisions that subsequently have been overturned,
the Supreme Court sustained convictions of individuals who criti-
cized the United States' role in World War I, on the theory that
such criticism might undermine national security.67 In contrast,
at least since its 1969 decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio,68 the Court
consistently has insisted that there must be a very close causal
commercial speech); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding that statute restricting phar-
maceutical advertising was unconstitutional because such advertising was
protected speech under First Amendment).
65. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-9.
66. See Edward J. Bloustein,'Criminal Attempts and the "Clear and Present Dan-
ger" Theory of the First Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1118, 1130 (1989) (noting
that in cases decided in 1920s and 1930s, "the mere 'bad tendency' of offending
speech, however remote the consequences, was considered a sufficient constitu-
tional basis for its limitation").
67. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1928) (upholding conviction
for distribution of communist leaflet on rationale that it could lead to overthrow
of government); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (noting that
speech calling for general strike was threat to national security); Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (holding that speech supporting socialism could be
regulated to protect nation from internal strife); Frohwerk v. United States, 249
U.S. 204 (1919) (upholding Espionage Act, enacted to regulate speech seen as
threat to national security).
68. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that for speech to be regulated, state
must show that it is direct incitement of imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action).
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connection between speech and any harm it will allegedly cause,
for such harm to justify suppressing the speech.
IV. OVERLY BROAD RESTRICTIONS ON WORKPLACE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT Do NOT EFFECTIVELY ADVANCE, AND
COULD WELL UNDERMINE, GENDER EQUALITY
As discussed above, certain narrowly defined categories of
hate speech may be prohibited to protect the equality rights of
individuals who must be on campus or in the workplace to pursue
their educations or their jobs. To broaden the range of prohib-
ited hate speech would not only undermine the central guarantee
of free speech, but it also would fail to serve the avowed purpose
of advancing gender equality. Overly broad definitions of prohib-
ited harassment or hate speech are at best ineffective in advancing
equality, and at worst they are counterproductive.
Throughout American history, measures designed to afford
special "protection" to women in the work force have in fact un-
dermined women's full and equal participation. Any overly broad
restriction of sexually explicit speech in the workplace that is
designed to "protect" female workers would follow in this tradi-
tion. As the philosopher George Santayana observed, "Those
who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."69
Accordingly, a brief review of the relevant history is in order.
By the early twentieth century, more than half of the Ameri-
can states had enacted some form of special "protective" labor
laws for women workers. 70 Some laws restricted women from en-
tire occupations or limited their hours of work.7 1 Other laws
granted women benefits that men did not enjoy, including a mini-
mum wage, overtime pay, lunch breaks and rest breaks. 72 The
classic defense of gender-based employment legislation intended
to aid women workers is contained in the Supreme Court's 1908
decision in Muller v. Oregon:73
As minors, though not to the same extent, she ["Wo-
man"] has been looked upon in the courts as needing
69. 1 GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON (1905).
70. JUDITH A. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
TO WOMEN'S LABOR LEGISLATION 31-33 (1978).
71. ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING
WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 185-86 (1982); WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK:
SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB 45 (Barbara F. Reskin & Heidi I. Hartmann eds.,
1986).
72. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 71, at 181-83, 185, 187.
73. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
1992] 777
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
especial care that her rights may be preserved. ... [S]he
is properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation
designed for her protection may be sustained, even
when like legislation is not necessary for men and could
not be sustained.74
As the Supreme Court noted in 1973, in actual operation,
these "protective" laws "put women, not on a pedestal, but in a
cage." 75 This protective labor legislation at best has been only
partially beneficial to women; historical evidence reveals compel-
lingly that it has always carried concealed costs, such as the loss of
jobs and the depression of women's wages. 76 Moreover, any doc-
trine resting upon the incomparability of the sexes cannot be con-
fined to circumstances which may at first appear "beneficial"; the
principle can always then be used to "justify" the denial of
rights. 77 For example, by invoking women's special reproductive
role, certain employers have excluded women from high-paying
jobs that entail exposure to certain substances that might impair
their fetuses, even if the women do not intend to have children,
and even though there is evidence that these substances could
damage the male reproductive functions as well. 78
"Protectionist" measures designed to shelter women from
sexually explicit expression conform to the general pattern of
gender-specific "protectionist" measures by actually operating to
women's detriment. Regardless of the benevolent intent of such
74. Id. at 421-22.
75. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion).
76. For example, the required eight-hour work day for women (but not for
men) resulted in a loss of jobs for women in gender-integrated jobs, probable
wage depression for women in gender-segregated jobs and a net loss of employ-
ment for immigrant women. See BARBARA A. BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINA-
TION AND THE LAw: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 36, 48, 268, 272-77 (1975); Elisabeth
M. Landes, The Effect of State Maximum-Hours Laws on the Employment of Women in
1920, 88J. POL. ECON. 476 (1980).
77. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974) (finding that in-
surance program that excluded pregnancy-related disability was not "invidious
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause").
78. See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct.
1196, 1197 (1991) (noting that company barred all women, except those with
medically documented infertility, from positions involving actual or potential
lead exposure); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11 th
Cir. 1984) (describing how hospital fired pregnant radiology technician on basis
that any exposure to radiation was potentially harmful to fetus); Wright v. Olin
Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1447, 1448 (W.D.N.C.) (discussing policy under which cor-
poration classified positions as restricted, controlled and unrestricted; excluded
fertile female employees from restricted jobs and limited access to controlled
jobs), vacated, 767 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1984).
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measures, they in fact reflect and reinforce a patronizing, pater-
nalistic view of women's sexuality that is inconsistent with wo-
men's full equality. This point has been made by feminists in a
context highly analogous to the present one: the controversy
over whether certain sexually-oriented "pornography," defined
as "subordinating" women, should be censored. While some
feminists advocate such censorship, others oppose it.
For example, in 1985, the Feminist Anti-Censorship
Taskforce (FACT) submitted a brief opposing a city ordinance
drafted by feminist pro-censorship advocates Andrea Dworkin
and Catharine MacKinnon, which punished "pornography," de-
fined as any "sexually explicit subordination of women through
pictures and/or words," 79 that was "demeaning" to women as a
violation of women's civil rights. To the contrary, the FACT brief
argued, the Dworkin-MacKinnon ordinance would itself violate
women's civil rights.80 That brief's warning words are also appli-
cable to overly broad restrictions on sexually explicit expression
in the workplace:
The ordinance presumes women as a class (and only wo-
men) are subordinated by virtually any sexually explicit
image....
Such assumptions reinforce and perpetuate central
sexist stereotypes; they weaken, rather than enhance,
women's struggles to free themselves of archaic notions
of gender roles .... In treating women as a special class,
[this ordinance] repeats the error of earlier protectionist
legislation which gave women no significant benefits and
denied their equality.8 1
Significantly, the analogy between the Dworkin-MacKinnon
ordinance and overly broad restrictions on sexually oriented ex-
pression in the workplace, under the rubric of sexual harassment,
has been noted by advocates on both sides of the Robinson case.
On the one hand, the attorney for Jacksonville Shipyards has re-
79. ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND
CIVIL RIGHTS 36 (1988).
80. See Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-
Censorship Taskforce, et al., in American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 21 U.
MIcH. J.L. REF. 69 (1987-1988) [hereinafter FACT Brief] (arguing that anti-por-
nography ordinance suppresses constitutionally protected speech in manner
particularly detrimental to women, unconstitutionally discriminates on basis of
sex and reinforces sexist stereotypes).
81. Id. at 122.
1992] 779
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
lied on8 2 the judicial ruling invalidating the Dworkin-MacKinnon
ordinance in American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut.8 3 On the other
hand, a recent law review article that supports the Robinson ruling
argues that, "although the parallels between the cases are invit-
ing, ...the Hudnut First Amendment analysis simply does not
apply to sexual harassment cases like Robinson."8 4
Putting aside the constitutional law distinctions previously
discussed, 5 between measures limiting speech in a public forum
(as the Dworkin-MacKinnon ordinance would have done) and
those limiting speech in the workplace, the Dworkin-MacKinnon
ordinance and restrictions on sexually-oriented workplace ex-
pression are united by a common vision of the harm that sexually
explicit speech allegedly inflicts upon women. That vision, in
turn, reflects a concept of women's unique vulnerability to speech
about sex-and, indeed, to sex itself-that many feminists find
antithetical to gender equality.8 6
Reflecting the view of many feminists that the Dworkin-
MacKinnon approach to sexually-oriented speech undermines
equality, in 1991 and 1992 many feminists and feminist groups
opposed a proposed congressional statute that embodied the
Dworkin-MacKinnon philosophy. The opposing groups included
FACT, Feminists for Free Expression and various chapters of the
National Organization for Women, including its two largest chap-
ters (in California and New York). For example, Feminists for
Free Expression explained:
Women do not require "protection" from explicit sexual
materials. It is no goal of feminism to restrict individual
choices or stamp out sexual imagery .... Women are as
varied as any citizens of a democracy; there is no agree-
ment or feminist code as to what images are distasteful
or even sexist. It is the right and responsibility of each
woman to read, view or produce the sexual material she
chooses without the intervention of the state "for her
own good." We believe genuine feminism encourages
82. See Trial Brief for Defendants at 44-45, Robinson v. Jacksonville Ship-
yards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (No. 86-927).
83. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
84. Horton, Comment, supra note 38, at 408, 433-36.
85. For a discussion of these constitutional law distinctions, see supra notes
3-21 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, The Convergence of Feminist and Civil Liberties
Principles in the Pornography Debate, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 201 (1987) (reviewing Wo-
MEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP (Varda Burstyn ed., 1985)).
780 [Vol. 37: p. 757
WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT
individuals to make these choices for themselves.8 7
There is yet another reason why weakening free speech in the
workplace may undermine, rather than foster, gender equality:
history has shown that a free speech regime is particularly impor-
tant to the cause of women's equality. Historically, the suppres-
sion of free speech has been a major tactic of the anti-feminist
movement. From 1873 until 1971, the Comstock Act was used to
suppress information about contraception and abortion.88 More
recently, repeated attempts have been made to ban the feminist
magazine Ms. from high school libraries,8 9 and the Supreme
Court has approved the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices' "gag rule," which prevents the millions of women who seek
health care at federally-funded family planning clinics from re-
ceiving full and accurate information about their reproductive
options .90
Advocates of social change, including feminists, have a spe-
cial stake in preserving freedom of expression. Therefore, the
important goal of promoting meaningful gender equality in em-
ployment, including the elimination of sexual harassment, must
be pursued through means that are consistent with free speech.
In fact, measures that focus on sexually-oriented expression di-
vert attention and efforts from the most significant causes of gen-
der discrimination.
Feminist scholars have identified the following as far more
profound sources of women's inequality in employment, as well
as in society more generally, than the availability of sexually-ori-
ented expression:
87. See Letter from Ad Hoc Committee of Feminists for Free Expression to
the SenateJudiciary Committee 2 (Feb. 14, 1992) (on file with the Villanova Law
Review).
88. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1462 (1964) (prohibited use of mail or common car-
rier to convey article, matter, thing, device or substance to be used to prevent
contraception or produce abortion) (amended 1971 to remove "preventing con-
traception" language; current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1462 (1988)); 19
U.S.C. § 1305 (1964) (prohibited importation of any article regarding preven-
tion of conception or causing unlawful abortion) (amended 1971 to remove
"prevention of contraception" language; current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1305
(1988)).
89. See, e.g., Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H.
1979).
90. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). President Clinton pledged
to revoke the "gag rule" and did so as one of his first official acts. See Elaine S.
Povich, Clinton Expected to Reverse Federal Policy on Abortion, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 7,
1992, at Cl; Robin Toner, Settling In: Easing Abortion Policy: Clinton Orders Rever-
sal of Abortion Restrictions Left by Reagan and Bush, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 23, 1993, § 1, at
1.
1992]
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
[the] sex segregated wage labor market; systematic de-
valuation of work traditionally done by women; sexist
concepts of marriage and family; inadequate income
maintenance programs for women unable to find wage
work; lack of day care services and the premise that child
care is an exclusively female responsibility; barriers to
reproductive freedom; and discrimination and segrega-
tion in education and athletics. 9 1
By targeting the foregoing problems, we can make meaningful
contributions to promoting women's equality-at work and in so-
ciety at large-consistent with free speech. In contrast, in terms
of women's equality at work and elsewhere, overly broad restric-
tions on sexually-oriented workplace speech would do more harm
than good.
V. CONCLUSION
Applying general principles governing the permissibility of
restrictions on racist or sexist hate speech or harassment requires
a sensitivity to factual details and distinctions from case to case.
General principles that respect both free speech and equality con-
cerns must be applied to each particular factual context in a way
that furthers respect for both sets of concerns. To craft or apply
rules that would regulate more broadly than this Article has advo-
cated would disserve the goals of both free speech and equality.
91. FACT Brief, supra note 80, at 124.
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APPENDIX A: ACLU POLICY STATEMENT
FREE SPEECH AND BIAS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES
9 2
The significant increase in reported incidents of racism and
other forms of bias at colleges and universities is a matter of
profound concern to the ACLU. Some have proposed that ra-
cism, sexism, homophobia and other such biases on campus must
be addressed in whole or in part by restrictions on speech. The
alternative to such restrictions, it is said, is to permit such bias to
go unremedied and to subject the targets of such bias to a loss of
equal educational opportunity. The ACLU rejects both these al-
ternatives and reaffirms its traditional and unequivocal commit-
ment both to free speech and to equal opportunity.
Freedom of thought and expression are indispensable to the
pursuit of knowledge and the dialogue and dispute that character-
ize meaningful education. All members of the academic commu-
nity have the right to hold and to express views that others may
find repugnant, offensive, or emotionally distressing. The ACLU
opposes all campus regulations which interfere with the freedom
of professors, students and administrators to teach, learn, discuss
and debate or to express ideas, opinions or feelings in classroom,
public or private discourse.93
The ACLU has opposed and will continue to oppose and
challenge disciplinary codes that reach beyond permissible
boundaries into the realm of protected speech, even when those
codes are directed at the problem of bias on campus. 94
This policy does not prohibit colleges and universities from
enacting disciplinary codes aimed at restricting acts of harass-
ment, intimidation and invasion of privacy. 95 The fact that words
may be used in connection with otherwise actionable conduct
92. Adopted by ACLU Board of Directors at Board Meeting, October 13-
14, 1990, and revised March, 1991.
93. See, generally, ACLU Policies #60, #63, #65, and #71.
94. The ACLU to date has opposed overbroad student speech codes
adopted by the University of Connecticut, the University of Michigan, the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin and the University of California.
95. Although "harassment," "intimidation," and "invasion of privacy" are
imprecise terms susceptible of impermissibly overbroad application, each term
defines a type of conduct which is legally proscribed in many jurisdictions when
directed at a specific individual or individuals and when intended to frighten,
coerce, or unreasonably harry or intrude upon its target. Threatening tele-
phone calls to a minority student's dormitory room, for example, would be pros-
cribable conduct under the terms of this policy. Expressive behavior which has
no other effect than to create an unpleasant learning environment, however,
would not be the proper subject of regulation. See Policy # 316.
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does not immunize such conduct from appropriate regulation. 96
As always, however, great care must be taken to avoid applying
such provisions overbroadly to protected expression. The ACLU
will continue to review such college codes and their application in
specific situations on a case-by-case basis under the principles set
forth in this policy and in Policy #72. 9 7
All students have the right to participate fully in the educa-
tional process on a nondiscriminatory basis. Colleges and univer-
sities have an affirmative obligation to combat racism, sexism,
homophobia, and other forms of bias, and a responsibility to pro-
vide equal opportunities through education. To address these re-
sponsibilities and obligations, the ACLU advocates the following
actions by colleges and universities:
(1) to utilize every opportunity to communicate through
its administrators, faculty, and students its commitment
to the elimination of all forms of bigotry on campus;
(2) to develop comprehensive plans aimed at reducing
prejudice, responding promptly to incidents of bigotry
and discriminatory harassment, and protecting students
from any further such incidents;
(3) to pursue vigorously efforts to attract enough minor-
ities, women and members of other historically disadvan-
taged groups as students, faculty members and
administrators to alleviate isolation and to ensure real
integration and diversity in academic life;
(4) to offer and consider whether to require all students
to take courses in the history and meaning of prejudice,
including racism, sexism, and other forms of invidious
discrimination; 98
96. For example, intimidating telephone calls, threats of attack, extortion
and blackmail are unprotected forms of conduct which include an element of
verbal or written expression.
97. In determining whether a university disciplinary code impermissibly re-
stricts protected speech, there must be a searching analysis both of the code and
the manner in which it is applied. Many factors, which are heavily fact-oriented,
must be considered, including time, place, pattern of conduct, and the existence
of an authority relationship between speaker and target.
98. See ACLU Policy #60, which states: "In the classroom, a teacher
should promote an atmosphere of free inquiry. This should include discussion
of controversial issues without the assumption that they are settled in advance or
that there is only one 'right' answer in matters of dispute. Such discussion
should include presentation of divergent opinions and doctrines, past and pres-
ent, on a given subject. The teacher's own judgment forms a part of this mate-
rial. If such judgment is clearly stated, students are better able to appraise it and
to differ from it on the basis of other materials and views placed at their disposal
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(5) to establish new-student orientation programs and
continuing counseling programs that enable students of
different races, sexes, religions, and sexual orientations
to learn to live with each other outside the classroom;
(6) to review and revise course offerings as well as extra-
curricular programs in order to recognize the contribu-
tions of those whose art, music, literature and learning
have been insufficiently reflected in the curriculum of
many American colleges and universities;
(7) to address the question of defacto segregation in dor-
mitories and other university facilities; and
(8) to take such other steps as are consistent with the
goal of ensuring that all students have an equal opportu-
nity to do their best work and to participate fully in cam-
pus life.
This policy is issued in connection with, and is intended as an
interpretation and enhancement of, the binding resolution on ra-
cist speech adopted at the 1989 Biennial Conference. That reso-
lution provides:
The ACLU should undertake educational activities to
counter incidents of racist, sexist, anti-semitic, and
homophobic behavior (including speech) on school cam-
puses and should encourage school administrators to
speak out vigorously against such incidents. At the same
time the ACLU should undertake educational activities
to counter efforts to limit or punish speech on university
campuses.
than they would be if a teacher were to attempt to conceal bias by a claim to
'objective' scholarship. No set procedures for conduct of a class or for use of
materials can guarantee the teacher's own integrity or take its place." [Board
Minutes, January 26-27, 1991.]
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